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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion content/operate/oss_and_stack/management/security/acl.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -597,7 +597,7 @@ For Sentinel, allow the user to access the following commands both in the master

Sentinel does not need to access any key in the database but does use Pub/Sub, so the ACL rule would be the following (note: [`AUTH`](/content/commands/auth.md) is not needed since it is always allowed):

ACL SETUSER sentinel-user on >somepassword allchannels +multi +slaveof +ping +exec +subscribe +config|rewrite +role +publish +info +client|setname +client|kill +script|kill
ACL SETUSER sentinel-user on >somepassword resetchannels &__sentinel__:hello +multi +slaveof +ping +exec +subscribe +config|rewrite +role +publish +info +client|setname +client|kill +script|kill

Redis replicas require the following commands to be allowed on the master instance:

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7 changes: 5 additions & 2 deletions content/operate/oss_and_stack/management/sentinel.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -828,7 +828,8 @@ than to all channels (`allchannels`, equivalently `&*`).
> monitored master and replica. Sentinels periodically publish their presence there and
> subscribe to it to discover other Sentinels and learn the current topology. These messages
> carry no authentication and are trusted by receiving Sentinels, so any client that can
> publish to this channel on a monitored node can inject forged topology information and
> publish to this channel on a monitored node can send forged HELLO messages that redirect a Sentinel to an attacker-controlled endpoint,
> potentially exposing the configured master credentials sent over command and Pub/Sub connections, and
> trigger spurious failovers or a denial of service.
>
> Because of this, do not grant broad Pub/Sub access on Sentinel-monitored Redis nodes:
Expand All @@ -838,7 +839,9 @@ than to all channels (`allchannels`, equivalently `&*`).
> other user should be able to publish to or subscribe to it. Since Redis 7.0, the default
> value of `acl-pubsub-default` is `resetchannels`, so newly created ACL users have no
> channel access unless you grant it explicitly. Be especially careful with the legacy
> `default` user, which may still have broad access.
> `default` user, which may still have broad access. This documentation change does not alter existing ACL configurations. Review ACL users on monitored masters and replicas,
> including the legacy `default` user, and confirm that no non-Sentinel user can publish to or subscribe to
> `__sentinel__:hello`.
> * Treat the `__sentinel__:` channel prefix as reserved for Sentinel's internal use.

### Redis password-only authentication
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