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Thanks for this PR — pinning third-party actions to full commit SHAs is a solid security hardening step, and it's consistent with the existing setup-uv pin style. I've reviewed the changes and unfortunately found two blocking SHA mismatches, plus a few notes: Blocking: incorrect SHA for pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish Blocking: incorrect SHA for CodSpeedHQ/action Note: consider using release/v1 SHA instead of a fixed release SHA for pypi-publish peaceiris SHA — confirmed correct Happy to approve once the two SHA issues above are fixed. |
waketzheng
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Would better to add a .github/dependabot.yml like:
version: 2
updates:
# GitHub Actions: daily/weekly/monthly
- package-ecosystem: "github-actions"
directory: "/"
schedule:
interval: "monthly"
Hi, and thank you for Tortoise ORM.
CI supply-chain hardening that matches a practice you already follow. Every workflow already SHA-pins
astral-sh/setup-uv(…08807647… # v8.1.0), but four third-party actions in secret-bearing jobs are still on mutable refs:peaceiris/actions-gh-pages@v3(×2, holdsPERSONAL_TOKENthat pushes totortoise/tortoise.github.io)CodSpeedHQ/action@v3(holdsCODSPEED_TOKEN)pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish@release/v1(a mutable branch, holdspypi_password)This PR pins each to the commit its current ref points at, with a version comment — same style as your setup-uv pin. I stayed on the v3 line for the two
@v3actions (no major-version change) and used the current v1 release for pypi-publish. Dependabot'sgithub-actionsecosystem can bump these going forward.Verified SHAs: peaceiris v3.9.3
373f7f2…, CodSpeed v3.8.176578c2…, pypi-publish v1.14.06733eb7….For transparency: I used AI assistance to spot and draft this; I verified the refs and resolved the SHAs myself.