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refactor(circuits)!: prove C4 one CRT limb at a time - #2533
Split from #2398 (Zara's work). Stacked on #2532 (large/c6-chonk); review that one first.
At 28 honest parties C4 is a 2^24 circuit, over a node's 13 GiB per-job budget. Its openings and sums
are independent per CRT limb, and the aggregate commitment C6 reads is one SAFE sponge over the
normalized limbs in order. So this proves each limb separately and carries that sponge between them,
the way C2 is already proven as a chunk chain. The last limb squeezes the unchunked C4 commitment, so
C6 and every commitment link are unchanged.
share_decryption_limb_0/1/2 each run C4's statement for one limb (aggregate_limb: checked
openings of the H dealer shares, sum, reverse and center) and continue the aggregate sponge from
the state the previous limb left. Each limb starts at its own fixed sponge position, so every
absorb position is static and each limb has its own circuit.
The final share_decryption circuit verifies the three limb proofs, each with its own key, links
them from the fresh sponge (DS_SHARE_DECRYPTION_CHAIN_STATE) and returns the aggregate commitment
then the hash of the limb keys.
c4ab_fold folds that key hash into its own key hash next to the C4 key, and the VK tree's C4 node
is hash(C4, C4 chain, C4, C4 chain), so the anchor pins every limb circuit. A peer verifying a C4
directly compares the key tree with its own limb keys (zk_verify_share_proof_bundle, secret-shared
profile only; the synchronized C4 stays a single circuit).
The C4 output layout gains a trailing key_tree field. The C4→C6 links extract commitment by
name from the tail, so they still find it. The C2→C4 link's row bound now requires both C4 outputs
(aggregate commitment and key tree) after a row.
The limb circuits are proven non-ZK and only verified inside the final circuit, so the build
publishes them in the default variant alone, as it does the C2 chunks. required-artifacts.json
lists them.
aggregate_limb (one limb, opening the C2 commitments) and the synchronized C4
(aggregate_canonical_shares) share the per-limb arithmetic (aggregate_canonical_limb), so
there is one definition of the sum, reverse and center step.
Benchmarks gain the three limb cases and prove the final C4 through the chain.
node_fold, nodes_fold and nodes_fold_kernel call the length c4ab_fold passes on C4_FOLDED_LEN, now one field shorter than c4ab_fold::C4_PUBLIC_LEN, as they already do for C2.
Verification
Per the current stack policy, tests are not run here; CI runs them. Static checks run on this branch:
nargo check and nargo compile of the dkg, recursive_aggregation and synchronized circuit
workspaces; scripts/circuits/lint.sh.
cargo check -p e3-zk-config -p e3-zk-witness -p e3-zk-build -p e3-zk-prover -p e3-zk-benchmarks --all-targets
and cargo check --workspace --all-targets, which only fails in the e3-evm, e3-evm-client and e3-indexer tests for missing generated contract bindings; cargo fmt --all --check.
prettier --check on the changed Markdown and JSON.
node scripts/blueprint/check.mjs (without --fix) moves no reference relative to main.
Tests this change adds or extends, for CI:
nargo test in circuits/lib: limb_chain_equals_the_unchunked_c4_commitment (the three limb
steps, chained, return the unchunked C4 commitment) and the chain's tamper tests.
cargo test -p e3-zk-witness --test dkg_samples: limb_chain_aggregate_equals_the_unchunked_commitment pins that the limb chain's aggregate equals
the unchunked C4 commitment on a real sample.
-p e3-zk-config --test circuit_identity, -p e3-zk-build, the C4/C6 commitment link tests, and
the C4 cases of local_e2e_tests and node_fold_correlated_e2e_tests.
The layout locks (-p e3-net --lib layout_lock, -p e3-slashing --lib layout_lock, -p e3-zk-prover --lib layout_lock, -p e3-tests --test layout_lock) gain rows for the three new CircuitName variants. They are not regenerated on this branch.
Compatibility
Breaking within the unreleased protocol-9 cutover (no separate counter change): drain-and-resync.
The C4 circuit, c4ab_fold and the VK tree's C4 node change, with them every nodes-tree anchor and
the DKG wrapper (BfvPkVerifier). The C6 tree and the decryption wrapper do not depend on C4. The
deployed verifiers and artifacts from before this change do not accept the new proofs; drain
first. Rollback: drain, then restore the previous binary and artifacts.
The C4 commitments are unchanged, so C6 and the commitment-consistency links need no change. The
C4 public output gains one trailing field (the limb key tree).
Storage schema and gossip/sync majors are unchanged. CircuitName::DkgShareDecryptionLimb0/1/2 are
appended after the existing variants, so stored encodings keep their indices. Limb proofs are never
persisted or gossiped.
The VK catalogue (circuits/vk-commitments.json), the Solidity verifiers, the BFV VK-binding
fixture and the layout-lock fixtures are regenerated once, from one matrix build, in chore(circuits): regenerate the circuit outputs of the large stack #2541 (large/circuit-outputs), near the top of
the stack. Until then this PR's circuit, verifier and layout-lock checks
fail by design.
Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
C4 share decryption now uses a linked chain of proofs across three CRT limbs while preserving the aggregate commitment.
Final C4 proofs include a hash of the limb verification keys, which recursive aggregation binds into its key hash.
Improvements
Proof verification and commitment checks now account for the linked limb proofs and their key trees.
Documentation and benchmark coverage now include the C4 limb-proof workflow.
Compatibility
Drain in-flight E3s containing stored C4 proofs before upgrading; those proofs cannot be folded, link-checked, or verified by peers after the change.
Update 2026-11-21: rebased onto main (#2524–#2530) and Fable review fixes
7975f307a: negative tests for the Chain state mismatch and Chain must start fresh asserts; LimbChain::compute returns an error instead of panicking on a short row; the unused Inputs::to_json is gone; upgrades.md records chunked C4; the blueprint names the verifier as the limb_proofs consumer.
f7a9fc385: C4 inputs whose share and commitment row counts differ are rejected.
No actionable comments were generated in the recent review.
Walkthrough
C4 share decryption now uses three CRT-limb proofs linked by a carried sponge state. The final circuit verifies the proofs and returns the aggregate commitment and limb-key hash. Prover, verification-key tree, public-signal layouts, benchmarks, tests, and documentation now include the limb chain.
Changes: C4 Limb Proof Chain
Layer / File(s)
Summary
Limb circuit contracts and chain logic circuits/bin/dkg/*, circuits/lib/src/core/dkg/*, circuits/lib/src/math/commitments.nr, crates/zk/config/src/circuit.rs
Three limb circuits call shared per-limb commitment verification and aggregation logic. Chain helpers carry and validate the sponge state. Tests check equivalence with the unchunked commitment and reject invalid commitments or links.
Witness generation and limb proving crates/zk/witness/src/dkg/*, crates/zk/witness/src/commitments.rs, crates/zk/prover/src/circuits/aggregation/*, crates/zk/prover/src/lib.rs
The witness layer computes and serializes each limb’s inputs and sponge state. The prover loads limb artifacts, proves each limb, and assembles proofs and links for the final circuit.
Final proof verification and key binding circuits/bin/recursive_aggregation/*, crates/zk/config/src/output_layout.rs, crates/zk/prover/src/circuits/dkg/share_decryption.rs, crates/zk/prover/src/commitment_links/*, crates/zk/prover/src/request_execution*, crates/zk/build/src/vk_tree.rs
The final circuit verifies the limb proofs and returns the aggregate commitment and limb-key hash. Recursive folding, verification-key trees, public-signal layouts, commitment-link checks, and secret-shared proof verification include the limb chain.
Build, benchmark, and test integration circuits/benchmarks/config.json, crates/zk/benchmarks/src/circuit_benchmark/*, crates/zk/build/src/artifacts.rs, crates/zk/build/src/tests.rs, crates/zk/prover/required-artifacts.json, crates/zk/prover/tests/*
Circuit selection and benchmark preparation include the three limb circuits. Build and prover test setup includes the default limb artifacts and the final C4 circuit.
Documentation and source references circuits/README.md, circuits/bin/dkg/share_decryption/README.md, circuits/lib/src/README.md, docs/architecture/proof-statements.md, docs/pages/*, scripts/blueprint/*
Documentation describes the limb chain, its outputs, and key-tree binding. Blueprint references reflect the changed source locations and C4 proof-chain implementation.
sequenceDiagram
participant Witness as LimbChain
participant Prover as ZkProver
participant Limbs as Limb circuits
participant Final as share_decryption
participant Fold as c4ab_fold
Witness->>Prover: Provide limb witnesses and sponge links
Prover->>Limbs: Prove each CRT limb
Limbs-->>Prover: Return limb proofs and public links
Prover->>Final: Provide proofs, verification keys, and links
Final->>Final: Verify proofs and check the limb chain
Final-->>Fold: Return aggregate commitment and limb-key hash
Fold->>Fold: Bind each C4 limb key tree into the key hash
Loading
Suggested labels:noir, refactoring
Suggested reviewers:cedoor, neogiacomo
Merge Risk: Minimal · up to f7a9f
The limb-chain witness code now returns an error for malformed limb dimensions instead of panicking. No merge-blocking issues remain from this review. The author notes that circuit and layout-lock checks depend on artifacts regenerated in a follow-up PR.
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The title "refactor(circuits)!: prove C4 one CRT limb at a time" names the main change. The PR splits C4 share decryption into three per-limb non-ZK proofs chained by one aggregate sponge state. A fin…
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Explanation
The title "refactor(circuits)!: prove C4 one CRT limb at a time" names the main change. The PR splits C4 share decryption into three per-limb non-ZK proofs chained by one aggregate sponge state. A final C4 circuit verifies those proofs and returns the unchanged aggregate commitment and a limb key-tree hash. The title is specific and concise, follows a conventional commit form, and the breaking-change marker matches the described drain-and-resync requirement.
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scripts/blueprint/facts/05-zk.json
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Actionable comments posted: 1
Fix comments: Fix CodeRabbit comments on this PR
Prompt to fix all issues
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @crates/zk/witness/src/dkg/share_decryption_chain.rs:
- Line 89: Update LimbChain::compute to validate inputs before the limb loop:
return WitnessError if any decrypted_shares or expected_commitments party row
has fewer entries than the configured limb count, or if their party counts
differ. Preserve the existing normalization path for valid inputs.
After applying the fix, consider running `coderabbit review --agent` for local
review. Visit https://docs.coderabbit.ai/cli?utm_source=ghpr
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…ommitments
At 28 honest parties C4 is a 2^24 circuit, over a node's 13 GiB per-job
budget. Its openings and sums are independent per limb, and the aggregate
commitment C6 reads is one SAFE sponge over the normalized limbs in order,
so prove each limb separately and carry that sponge between them. The last
limb squeezes the unchunked C4 commitment; C6 is unchanged.
- aggregate_limb holds C4's per-limb statement (checked openings, sum,
reverse and center); the unchunked execute and the limb circuits share
it.
- share_decryption_limb_0/1/2 each start the aggregate sponge at their
limb's fixed position, so every absorb position is static. The final
share_decryption circuit verifies the three limbs, links them from the
fresh sponge and returns the aggregate commitment, then the limb key
tree.
- c4ab_fold and the VK tree anchor the key tree; peers check it when
verifying a C4. The C4 output layout names the trailing key tree.
- The limb circuits are published in the default variant only, as the C2
chunk circuits are.
- The circuit identity lock gains rows for the limb circuit names,
appended after the existing variants.
…length
C4 now also outputs its key tree, so c4ab_fold's C4_PUBLIC_LEN is one
field more than what the fold passes on. The node and nodes folds call
their length C4_FOLDED_LEN, as they already do for C2.
…anchor test
The limb keys are VK_PATHS 29..=31; 25..=28 are the C6 Chonk keys, so the
expected node tree used the wrong keys and the mutation loop counted the
limb keys as C6 descendants.
The peer C4 handler now checks the final C4's limb key tree. Run the
key-tree test over C4 as well as C2, so a regression to the bare
outer-proof check fails.
No circuit calls ShareDecryption::execute since C4 is proven per limb; only
the chain test used it as its oracle. Keep C4's role as module docs, take
the one-shot commitment from aggregate_canonical_shares in the test, and
point the blueprint at the limb statement and the chain check.
The final C4 returns its limb key tree after the aggregate commitment. Say
so in the link's layout and row comment, and end the C4 test signals with
a key tree as a real final C4 does.
The final C4 proof now ends on two outputs (the aggregate commitment, then the limb key tree), but the C2-to-C4 row bound still asked for one field after the row. With one modulus the row one past the roster passed the bound and compared C2's commitments with C4's aggregate. Unreachable today (three moduli, roster-mapped rows); the bound is exact again.
…e grid
The final C4 circuit reads the expected commitments and the limb proofs only. Serializing every decrypted share and then removing them materialized H x L x N coefficients per proof (835,584 for secure Large) for nothing; the shares stay in the limb witnesses.
Two negative Noir tests cover the asserts that stop a prover substituting the carried sponge state or starting the chain from a state of its choice. LimbChain::compute returns an error for a party row with the wrong limb count instead of panicking, and the unused Inputs::to_json with its obsolete ABI comment is gone. The cutover doc records chunked C4, and the blueprint names the verifier as the consumer of limb_proofs.
Folded into #2531 so that each PR in the stack passes CI on its own: main requires template_integration, which cannot pass on a PR that changes circuits without their regenerated outputs. This PR's commits and description are unchanged inside #2531; its review threads stay here.
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What and why
Split from #2398 (Zara's work). Stacked on #2532 (
large/c6-chonk); review that one first.At 28 honest parties C4 is a 2^24 circuit, over a node's 13 GiB per-job budget. Its openings and sums
are independent per CRT limb, and the aggregate commitment C6 reads is one SAFE sponge over the
normalized limbs in order. So this proves each limb separately and carries that sponge between them,
the way C2 is already proven as a chunk chain. The last limb squeezes the unchunked C4 commitment, so
C6 and every commitment link are unchanged.
share_decryption_limb_0/1/2each run C4's statement for one limb (aggregate_limb: checkedopenings of the H dealer shares, sum, reverse and center) and continue the aggregate sponge from
the state the previous limb left. Each limb starts at its own fixed sponge position, so every
absorb position is static and each limb has its own circuit.
share_decryptioncircuit verifies the three limb proofs, each with its own key, linksthem from the fresh sponge (
DS_SHARE_DECRYPTION_CHAIN_STATE) and returns the aggregate commitmentthen the hash of the limb keys.
c4ab_foldfolds that key hash into its own key hash next to the C4 key, and the VK tree's C4 nodeis
hash(C4, C4 chain, C4, C4 chain), so the anchor pins every limb circuit. A peer verifying a C4directly compares the key tree with its own limb keys (
zk_verify_share_proof_bundle, secret-sharedprofile only; the synchronized C4 stays a single circuit).
key_treefield. The C4→C6 links extractcommitmentbyname from the tail, so they still find it. The C2→C4 link's row bound now requires both C4 outputs
(aggregate commitment and key tree) after a row.
publishes them in the
defaultvariant alone, as it does the C2 chunks.required-artifacts.jsonlists them.
aggregate_limb(one limb, opening the C2 commitments) and the synchronized C4(
aggregate_canonical_shares) share the per-limb arithmetic (aggregate_canonical_limb), sothere is one definition of the sum, reverse and center step.
node_fold,nodes_foldandnodes_fold_kernelcall the lengthc4ab_foldpasses onC4_FOLDED_LEN, now one field shorter thanc4ab_fold::C4_PUBLIC_LEN, as they already do for C2.Verification
Per the current stack policy, tests are not run here; CI runs them. Static checks run on this branch:
nargo checkandnargo compileof thedkg,recursive_aggregationand synchronized circuitworkspaces;
scripts/circuits/lint.sh.cargo check -p e3-zk-config -p e3-zk-witness -p e3-zk-build -p e3-zk-prover -p e3-zk-benchmarks --all-targetsand
cargo check --workspace --all-targets, which only fails in thee3-evm,e3-evm-clientande3-indexertests for missing generated contract bindings;cargo fmt --all --check.prettier --checkon the changed Markdown and JSON.node scripts/blueprint/check.mjs(without--fix) moves no reference relative to main.Tests this change adds or extends, for CI:
nargo testincircuits/lib:limb_chain_equals_the_unchunked_c4_commitment(the three limbsteps, chained, return the unchunked C4 commitment) and the chain's tamper tests.
cargo test -p e3-zk-witness --test dkg_samples:limb_chain_aggregate_equals_the_unchunked_commitmentpins that the limb chain's aggregate equalsthe unchunked C4 commitment on a real sample.
-p e3-zk-config --test circuit_identity,-p e3-zk-build, the C4/C6 commitment link tests, andthe C4 cases of
local_e2e_testsandnode_fold_correlated_e2e_tests.-p e3-net --lib layout_lock,-p e3-slashing --lib layout_lock,-p e3-zk-prover --lib layout_lock,-p e3-tests --test layout_lock) gain rows for the three newCircuitNamevariants. They are not regenerated on this branch.Compatibility
Breaking within the unreleased protocol-9 cutover (no separate counter change): drain-and-resync.
c4ab_foldand the VK tree's C4 node change, with them every nodes-tree anchor andthe DKG wrapper (
BfvPkVerifier). The C6 tree and the decryption wrapper do not depend on C4. Thedeployed verifiers and artifacts from before this change do not accept the new proofs; drain
first. Rollback: drain, then restore the previous binary and artifacts.
C4 public output gains one trailing field (the limb key tree).
CircuitName::DkgShareDecryptionLimb0/1/2areappended after the existing variants, so stored encodings keep their indices. Limb proofs are never
persisted or gossiped.
circuits/vk-commitments.json), the Solidity verifiers, the BFV VK-bindingfixture and the layout-lock fixtures are regenerated once, from one matrix build, in chore(circuits): regenerate the circuit outputs of the large stack #2541 (
large/circuit-outputs), near the top ofthe stack. Until then this PR's circuit, verifier and layout-lock checks
fail by design.
Summary by CodeRabbit
Update 2026-11-21: rebased onto main (#2524–#2530) and Fable review fixes
7975f307a: negative tests for theChain state mismatchandChain must start freshasserts;LimbChain::computereturns an error instead of panicking on a short row; the unusedInputs::to_jsonis gone;upgrades.mdrecords chunked C4; the blueprint names the verifier as thelimb_proofsconsumer.f7a9fc385: C4 inputs whose share and commitment row counts differ are rejected.