Please report security issues privately through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting or by e-mail to browsers@rabbitone.com. Please don't open a public issue for a vulnerability.
You can expect a reply within a few days. Fixes ship in the next release of the extension, and credit is given in the release notes if you want it.
Only the latest published version of the extension is supported.
Annotator makes no network requests of its own and stores everything locally in the browser's extension storage. The only fetch is the optional Page icons feature in Firefox, which downloads a tab's icon solely from the page's own HTTPS host (never in private windows). The most relevant reports are about page access (content script), the handling of imported files, and the handling of untrusted page content.
- Page overlays. A page can cover Annotator's interface with its own top-layer element (a dialog or popover) and imitate a toolbar. Annotator cannot prevent this from a content script.
- Highlights are visible to the page. Highlighted text is wrapped in elements that a page's
MutationObservercan see, including the category; this also lets a page detect that the extension is installed. - Clipboard fallback. When the asynchronous Clipboard API is unavailable, copying falls back to
execCommand('copy'), whosecopyevent is visible to page listeners. - Focus. A page can see the window lose focus when someone enters the note editor and may move focus to its own invisible field. This is the same class of attack as overlays and cannot be prevented from a content script.
- Note editor. The note editor runs in an extension-origin iframe so that scripts of the page cannot observe
typing.
editor.htmlis web-accessible, so a page can tell that the extension is present.