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Security: notinferred/keypaste

SECURITY.md

Security policy

Reporting a vulnerability

Email security@keypaste.com with the affected version or commit, a description, reproduction steps or proof of concept, and the expected impact. Reports in any language and anonymous reports are welcome. Do not use public issues, discussions or pull requests for vulnerabilities.

Response Target
Acknowledgement Within 72 hours
Initial assessment Within 7 days
Fix or mitigation plan Communicated when available, with a timeline
Coordinated disclosure Up to 90 days, shortened by agreement or active exploitation

Security reports receive the highest priority. Credit in advisories and the changelog is optional; there is no bug bounty. Breaches and serious shipped bugs receive prompt, full disclosure covering the incident, exposure and changes, as law 10 requires. All security-relevant fixes are disclosed.

Reports cover this repository, its build and release pipeline, and dependencies on the secret path. keypaste.com's signup endpoint, whose source is in the site's own repository, is also in scope because it stores email addresses. Static site content and third-party deployments are outside this reporting scope. Report upstream dependency vulnerabilities upstream and here; vendored patches must be merged manually.

Supported versions

The published release is the CLI and MCP bridge v0.3.0. The desktop app has no release; the next public release, 1.0.0, is its first. RELEASE.md records distribution status.

Version Supported Status
main Yes Fixes land here first
0.3.x Yes Current release line
0.2.x No Superseded; affected by the defects below
0.1.x No Superseded; affected by the defects below

There is no long-term support line before 1.0. Fixes enter main and the next release; older tags remain unchanged. Published archives are immutable, so old downloads keep their defects.

If you installed v0.1.0 or v0.2.0, replace it with v0.3.0 (changelog). These are the recorded defects of the superseded versions:

Defect In Fixed in
env export can delete your vault by writing over it v0.1.0 v0.2.0
env rm and env set can act on the wrong entry when a path is ambiguous v0.1.0 v0.2.0
get can return the wrong password v0.1.0 v0.2.0
env pull can delete an edit it never imported v0.1.0 v0.2.0
moving the clock back can revive an expired approval v0.1.0 v0.2.0
an approved credential too large to send costs you every other grant v0.1.0 v0.2.0
listing a large vault costs you every other grant v0.1.0 v0.2.0
an agent can queue approval prompts v0.1.0 v0.2.0
entry names can render unescaped v0.1.0 v0.2.0
saving while another program saves the same vault can undo its change, with no history entry v0.1.0, v0.2.0 v0.3.0
on Windows 11 24H2 and Windows Server 2025, a save can fail when another keypaste or KeePass program is saving at the same time; nothing is lost v0.1.0, v0.2.0 v0.3.0
an agent asking for entry names on a loaded machine can be told to start keypaste agent for a process that is already running; nothing is lost v0.2.0 v0.3.0

Verifying a release

CLI/MCP downloads at https://dl.keypaste.com/v<version>/ include SHA256SUMS, per-asset .sha256 files and corresponding source; v0.3.0 adds a manifest, keypaste-0.3.0-manifest.json, and an attestation bundle, keypaste-0.3.0-provenance.sigstore.jsonl; v0.2.0 and earlier have neither. release.yml tests the NativeAOT binaries it uploads, including KeePassXC compatibility in both directions. ci.yml runs the unit suites against an ordinary build of the same commit.

The binaries are unsigned and un-notarized, so Gatekeeper and SmartScreen may warn; README documents the macOS quarantine workaround, and its install blocks preserve quarantine.

Checksums detect corrupted or truncated downloads. Because the archive and checksum share an origin, an attacker who replaces both defeats that check.

v0.3.0 also carries a GitHub build attestation, signed through Sigstore by release.yml running in notinferred/keypaste for the release tag, covering every asset and the manifest. v0.2.0 and earlier have none. Checking one needs GitHub CLI (established with 2.86.0) and no GitHub account:

v=<version>
curl -fLO "https://dl.keypaste.com/v$v/keypaste-$v-linux-x64.tar.gz"
curl -fLO "https://dl.keypaste.com/v$v/keypaste-$v-provenance.sigstore.jsonl"
gh attestation verify "keypaste-$v-linux-x64.tar.gz" \
  --bundle "keypaste-$v-provenance.sigstore.jsonl" \
  --repo notinferred/keypaste \
  --signer-workflow notinferred/keypaste/.github/workflows/release.yml \
  --source-ref "refs/tags/v$v"

Substitute any other asset name. A changed byte, another repository or another workflow fails the check. A version that publishes the desktop packages carries a second manifest and bundle, keypaste-app-<version>-manifest.json and keypaste-app-<version>-provenance.sigstore.jsonl, in the same prefix; an MSI or AppImage is checked with the same command against its own bundle, and the signer workflow is still release.yml, which attests what it publishes rather than what compiled it. The command fetches Sigstore's public trust root; to check offline, run gh attestation trusted-root > trusted_root.jsonl on a connected machine and add --custom-trusted-root trusted_root.jsonl. Without --bundle, gh fetches the attestation from GitHub and requires gh auth login. verify-provenance.sh <version> downloads a whole release and checks the manifest and every asset this way; --component app does the same for the desktop packages.

An attestation shows which repository, workflow, tag and commit produced the bytes. It does not show that the source is safe, that the build is reproducible (it is not) or that the release workflow was uncompromised (THREATS.md T-21). README documents building from source with dependencies pinned by content hash in packages.lock.json.

Security laws

These laws stand above every other rule of keypaste's and change only by the founder's dated re-ratification. Laws 1 to 10 keep their earlier numbers, so an older citation of §3.4 means law 4.

  1. The vault master key never leaves the local process, including through telemetry or an encrypted server backup. There are no exceptions.
  2. Agents never get the vault. Each release contains one credential with one scope, or a linked set the person approves whole in one prompt, following explicit human approval or a pre-approved policy the human wrote, of which a category's Allow the human confirmed on this computer is one. A set is never released by a rule alone. Default is deny. A browser gets one login at a time, and only at the person's pick in keypaste's own in-page list, drawn apart from the page, which lists names and no password: the pick counts as their answer for a login already filled through that browser's pairing on that exact site, and a first fill of a login on a site, and every fill on a site keypaste asks about each time, is asked in keypaste.
  3. Every agent request for a value, a command, a save or a change to an item, and every login released to a browser with the page's origin, is recorded as its own line in a local, human-readable log before keypaste answers, recording who or what asked for which item, when, and whether it was granted or denied; nothing rewrites a line. An agent's lookups of names, a listing or a search, keep their own lines for 30 days and are then folded into one sealed summary line per agent per day. The person sets how long the log is kept, one year by default; older lines are removed only as whole days, behind a sealed line recording what was removed.
  4. Keypaste never writes secrets to disk unencrypted, except a key file the person asks keypaste to create, an attachment the person asks it to save and a file the person explicitly asks to export, such as env export --dotenv, each written once where they choose. Injection uses process environment memory only.
  5. Analytics and telemetry never include secret content or entry names. Only opt-in anonymous usage counts are permitted, and the desktop app's crash reports once the person says yes to them on its first launch, a yes of its own apart from accepting the terms of use, until they turn them off in Settings; a report holds no exception message, secret content, entry or vault name, file path or value.
  6. Use the KDBX4 specification (Argon2; AES-256, ChaCha20 or Twofish, the ciphers KeePassXC writes) through mature audited libraries. Never write custom cryptography or modify the format.
  7. Fail closed: every error path in the bridge denies access.
  8. The code is open source under AGPL-3.0 and stays open: the desktop app, the CLI, the bridge, the browser relay, the browser extension, which keeps the GPL-3.0 of the KeePassXC-Browser it is forked from, and all code that encrypts or handles vault data. keypaste's hosted services and separately sold add-ons may be closed. Auditable code establishes trust in an unknown founder.
  9. Dependencies are minimized and pinned. Every new dependency on the secret path is justified in one line beside the package in Directory.Packages.props.
  10. Provide a security policy, a private vulnerability-reporting contact and honest responses. Disclose breaches and serious shipped bugs promptly and fully.
  11. The bridge and the browser relay never open a vault; each forwards requests to the process holding it.
  12. A save never replaces a vault without keeping a backup and reading the new file back successfully.
  13. The trust boundary is the person's OS account: other processes running as the same user are outside keypaste's protection, as THREATS says.
  14. Every release opens every earlier release's vaults, and KeePassXC 2.7 or later opens what keypaste writes.

Guarantees and limits

The security laws govern these guarantees, and THREATS.md holds each one's detail and tests. v0.3.0 marks what the published CLI and bridge have (the source build keeps it); unreleased marks the source build headed for 1.0.0, which includes all of the desktop app. A line with neither mark holds for both.

Agent access

  • A release needs a person's answer or a rule the person set: per-category Ask, Allow or Block, Ask by default, each Allow confirmed in the app (unreleased); a policy.toml rule (v0.3.0) T-12 T-15.
  • One approval releases one field or attachment to an agent (v0.3.0: one field), or a linked set of up to four fields the person allows together, asked every time and recorded one line per field (unreleased) [T-56]; a whole env set to a child process for keypaste run --session and the run tool, asked every time (unreleased) T-30 T-35.
  • A scoped token releases its sets to keypaste run --token with no prompt, except protected sets (unreleased) T-32.
  • An entry's title, group, tags and URL, and its username unless Settings hides it, reach agents unasked (unreleased) T-4.
  • The bridge holds no vault and makes no network request (v0.3.0) T-9.
  • Every answered request is recorded before the reply, and an unrecordable release is refused (v0.3.0) T-6.
  • An agent sees only what its bridge's --expose reaches (v0.3.0) T-4.
  • A search names at most 25 items it reaches, with their origins, usernames while Settings shows them and the links among them, never a value (unreleased) T-55.
  • An agent may ask the person to save a value at a place it names and never receives it (unreleased) T-54.
  • An agent may ask the person to move an item it sees whole to Trash or mark it expired, and to delete for good only an item it created through an approved save; each of these is asked every time and made only once the person allows it. It may add or remove the item's needs-update tag without asking. Every change's line is written before the vault is saved, and a change whose line cannot be written is not made (unreleased) T-57.
  • Names and reasons are sanitized, and the reason is shown as the agent's (v0.3.0) T-1 T-2.
  • One prompt at a time, across every vault open in the app (unreleased); 45-second expiry; 60-second hold after a refusal (v0.3.0) T-11.
  • No agent request can make a password prompt appear (v0.3.0) T-7.
  • The local pipe admits only the current user (v0.3.0) T-10.
  • One owner per vault; CLI edits go to it and wait for the person (unreleased) T-29 T-43.
  • Agent rules hold only while sealed, each vault's apart and under its own key; anything else asks about every value (unreleased) T-15.
  • A tool Connect sets up reaches only the vaults it was connected to, through one bridge that asks each vault's own owner (unreleased) T-4.
  • The app's prompt says Verified only when the system shows keypaste's own program on the pipe, started by the AI tool its label names; otherwise Not verified. It decides nothing (unreleased) T-3.
  • Limit: client labels are unauthenticated, so whoever starts a bridge gets what an Allow gives, also under another agent's label; Verified does not stop a process of the same user T-3 T-14 T-36.
  • Limit: a rule covers the vault's current contents, so a new field or tag changes what an Allow releases T-13.
  • Limit: nobody reads the reason behind an unasked release, and timing reveals which categories are Allow T-12 T-17.
  • Limit: a run's command is the runner's claim, and a run can leak values its scrubber misses T-30 T-35.
  • Limit: a token bundle cannot be revoked; rotate its values T-32.
  • Limit: there is no prompt limit across entries T-11.
  • Limit: nothing recalls a client's copies or revokes a credential at its issuer T-12.

Browser fill (unreleased)

  • keypaste answers only its own extension's three builds, under its own host name, and never writes KeePassXC's T-48 T-49 T-60.
  • A browser pairs only once you confirm it in keypaste, which shows the code the extension shows beside Connect; one request is asked about at a time, and a refusal holds the next back from a minute up to an hour T-48.
  • One pairing per browser serves every vault unlocked on this computer. It is kept on this computer with only a hash of the extension's key, and counts only while an unlocked vault's seal holds it, so a program writing that file adds no pairing T-50.
  • Nothing is asked of keypaste as a page loads: a click on keypaste's key icon in a login field lists the page's logins from every open vault by name, with no password, and names the vaults that are locked T-59.
  • A login fills only when you pick it in that list: at once where that browser filled it on that exact site before, otherwise once you allow it in keypaste, which asks "Fill this login on this site?" naming the site; every login filled is recorded with the page's origin before it leaves keypaste T-59 T-61.
  • The list is drawn in a closed shadow root in the browser's top layer; a pick counts only from a trusted click or key, on a list that has been on screen half a second, that the page has not faded, filtered or covered. The extension takes the site from the browser's tab, never from the page T-59.
  • An item matches a page only on its own host or a subdomain, on the same scheme and port, within one registrable domain by the Public Suffix List, and the first fill on each subdomain is asked; a lookalike or another tenant of a shared host gets nothing. An http page, a single-label host and a form posting to another site are listed with a warning and asked in keypaste at every pick T-58.
  • The extension refuses a login form in a frame from another origin before keypaste is asked T-58.
  • A release carries one item's username and password, title and UUID, nothing else T-60.
  • Checked in real Chrome, Edge, Brave and Firefox on Windows, macOS and Linux with keypaste's test build (8.3a3).
  • Limit: whoever holds a pairing's key can list the names of the logins of any site it names and gets the logins that browser filled on a site before, unasked, by naming that site; anything able to start keypaste as the browser can put a pairing confirmation in front of you at any time, whose code differs from your browser's T-48 T-50 T-59 T-61.
  • Limit: a filled password belongs to the page and the extension, whose scripts or updates can send it anywhere T-60.
  • Limit: a page that fools a person into picking from a list it did not tamper with, or a page of the site itself that is compromised, gets the login it is picked on; whoever controls a subdomain of an item's site has its login listed there T-58 T-59.

What unlocks a vault

  • A master password; unreleased, also a keyfile, with or without a password, in every KeePass form; keypaste never creates a keyfile that is any file at all T-27 T-28.
  • Unreleased: a YubiKey slot in the desktop T-37, and Windows Hello after a lock on Windows T-44.
  • New vaults are KDBX4 with Argon2d at 2 iterations, 64 MiB and parallelism 2, pinned in src/Keypaste.Core/KdbxFormat.cs rather than taken from KeePassLib's defaults; keypaste writes no cryptography of its own and reaches the format only through src/Keypaste.Core/Internal/KeePassInterop.cs.
  • Limit: a copied vault can be guessed offline without limit T-20.
  • Limit: after a password or keyfile change, older copies and backups still open with the old credentials; delete them.
  • Limit: a lost keyfile or YubiKey cannot be recovered T-27 T-37.
  • Limit: whoever passes Windows Hello as the person, PIN included, can reopen the vault while the app runs T-44.

The desktop app (unreleased)

  • Secret fields show automation only their length T-22; a revealed value shows at most 30 seconds T-25.
  • Copies clear after 20 seconds if unchanged, as keypaste get does in v0.3.0 T-19.
  • Several vaults can be open at once, each with its own claim and pipe; the idle lock, Ctrl/Cmd+L and quitting lock them all T-23 T-29.
  • Idle lock after 30 minutes by default, at most 8 hours T-23.
  • Notifications carry fixed words only T-51.
  • Crash reports are sent only after consent, hold no value, name or path, and never come from the CLI or bridge T-9.
  • A save keeps the last five copies in <vault>.backups, and the newest of each of the last seven days and four weeks, restorable from the unlock screen T-26; deletion goes to the recycle bin (v0.3.0 deletes permanently).
  • A save whose new file drops an item of the file it replaces without recording a deletion, or differs from the open vault, is refused and replaces nothing, a hardware-key vault's included; the backup and the rename that replaces the vault are flushed to disk before the save returns.
  • Limit: screen capture and onlookers can read a revealed value T-25.
  • Limit: clipboard managers can ignore keypaste's markers T-19.
  • Limit: recent.toml shows where vaults and keyfiles are T-24.
  • Limit: an earlier master password and write access to the directory roll the vault back T-26; keep backups off the disk too.

Memory

  • Limit: no in-memory secrecy; immutable strings, swap, dumps and any process running as you can expose values, resolving a request reads passwords into memory, and keypaste cannot defend a compromised local account T-18.
  • Limit: v0.3.0 keeps an approved value for its --max-ttl; unreleased keeps none T-18.
  • Limit: keypaste approve has no idle lock T-7.

Plaintext and file limits

  • keypaste run passes values only in the child's environment and writes no environment file, which verify-run-injection.sh checks (v0.3.0) T-30.
  • Limit: the child keeps those values after a lock, and process inspection and logs can expose them.
  • Limit: env set project KEY=value puts the value in shell history; the command warns (v0.3.0).
  • Limit: a variable's earlier values stay in the vault's encrypted history, up to ten.
  • Limit: env export --dotenv writes plaintext, owner-only except on Windows, where it inherits directory permissions (founder decision, 2026-10-22) (v0.3.0).
  • Limit: attachment save writes an attachment unencrypted to a file keypaste cannot take back (unreleased).
  • Limit: deleting a file does not erase storage; rotate credentials that were committed or shared.
  • Limit: a share link opens for anyone holding it, and only a generated passphrase protects an intercepted link (unreleased) T-33.
  • Limit: a reference file chooses what a run injects T-31.

Audit

  • The log is hash-chained and appended to; keypaste log verify --expect <hash> checks it against an anchor you kept (v0.3.0) T-5.
  • Only the vault's owner rewrites it: lookups older than 30 days become one summary line per agent per day, days older than the period you keep it for (a year by default) are removed whole, every other line keeps its bytes, and a first line signed with the vault's key seals the result, which another open vault's owner checks under that key before it seals over it (unreleased) T-5.
  • The vault's owner signs the chain with a key the vault holds every 64 lines and when its session ends, and keypaste log verify --checkpoints checks those signatures, so a rewrite before the last one needs the unlocked vault (unreleased) T-5.
  • Each line the vault's owner writes for a connection names the program on it, its process id, executable path and code signature state, as advice it refuses nothing on (unreleased) T-10.
  • Entries are sanitized; a reason is kept as a 200-character excerpt, its length and hash (v0.3.0) T-2; v0.1.0 records the request argument, which can be an opaque handle.
  • Limit: lines after the last checkpoint are unsigned, and the tail can be deleted without trace unless you kept an anchor; keypaste keeps none (founder decision, 2026-10-22) T-5.
  • Limit: a browser fill's line names the site, as its origin, where each item was filled or refused (unreleased).
  • Limit: kept forever, the log grows until archived (archiving it); it can hold sensitive agent-written text.

Maintainer note

The reporting mailbox has been tested from an external address. GitHub private vulnerability reporting is currently disabled. KeePassLib provenance and local changes are recorded in UPSTREAM.md, and those of the BouncyCastle Twofish code it compiles in, which encrypts a Twofish vault, in its own. Reports to this project and upstream do not automatically reach one another.

There aren't any published security advisories