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One salt served the whole database, so a single argon2 evaluation per candidate password could be tested against every encrypted row at once — cracking many cost the same as cracking one — and two pastes sharing a password shared a key. The shipped default for it is the literal `somesalt`, so one precomputation works against every instance that never set the variable. Mint 16 random bytes per entry and store them beside the ciphertext in a new `salt` column, deriving with Argon2id, which RFC 9106 recommends over the Argon2i used here. Entries already stored keep the derivation they were sealed under, selected by whether they carry a salt; the process-wide salt stays for exactly those. A ciphertext captured from the old scheme guards that path, since nothing else would notice it breaking. Checked end to end as well: a database written by the previous release, with an encrypted paste in it, migrates and still opens with the right password. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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One salt served the whole database, so a single argon2 evaluation per candidate password could be tested against every encrypted row at once — cracking many cost the same as cracking one — and two pastes sharing a password shared a key. The shipped default for it is the literal
somesalt, so one precomputation works against every instance that never set the variable.Mint 16 random bytes per entry and store them beside the ciphertext in a new
saltcolumn, deriving with Argon2id, which RFC 9106 recommends over the Argon2i used here.Entries already stored keep the derivation they were sealed under, selected by whether they carry a salt; the process-wide salt stays for exactly those. A ciphertext captured from the old scheme guards that path, since nothing else would notice it breaking. Checked end to end as well: a database written by the previous release, with an encrypted paste in it, migrates and still opens with the right password.