feat(vllm): add testbed for CVE-2026-22778

vllm/CVE-2026-22778/Dockerfile

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+FROM docker.io/library/python:3.11-slim
+
+WORKDIR /app
+
+RUN pip install --no-cache-dir fastapi uvicorn pillow pydantic
+
+COPY server.py /app/server.py
+
+CMD ["python", "server.py"]

vllm/CVE-2026-22778/README.md

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+# CVE-2026-22778: vLLM Multimodal Endpoint Heap Memory Address Disclosure
+
+vLLM versions from `0.8.3` to before `0.14.1` contain a sensitive information disclosure vulnerability (CWE-209 / CWE-532). When an invalid image payload is sent to vLLM's OpenAI-compatible multimodal endpoint (`/v1/chat/completions`), Python's Pillow (`PIL`) library fails to decode the image and raises an `UnidentifiedImageError`. vLLM directly reflects this exception string back in the HTTP 400 response, leaking the raw heap memory address (`cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0x...>`). This leak significantly reduces ASLR entropy and can be chained with memory corruption vulnerabilities in native image decoders (such as OpenCV or OpenJPEG) to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE).
+
+In vLLM `0.14.1` ([PR #31987](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/31987)), the response is sanitized using `re.sub(r" at 0x[0-9a-f]+>", ">", message)` to strip memory addresses.
+
+## Lab Architecture
+
+This lab runs lightweight, CPU-compatible containers replicating vLLM's exact multimodal ingestion layer and error handling:
+- **Vulnerable (`vllm-vuln`):** Version `0.14.0` (HTTP port `8000`)
+- **Patched (`vllm-patched`):** Version `0.14.1` (HTTP port `8001`)
+
+Inside each container, `server.py` handles the OpenAI-compatible endpoints (`/v1/models`, `/v1/chat/completions`, `/version`, `/health`), using real Pillow decoding so the vulnerability triggers on CPU without requiring 30 GB of GPU images and model weights.
+
+### Why Official vLLM Images Are Not Feasible
+1. **CUDA / GPU Dependency:** Official vLLM container images (`vllm/vllm-openai:v0.14.0`) are ~9 GB compressed (~20 GB uncompressed) and require NVIDIA CUDA GPUs. They crash on startup on standard CPU environments due to PyTorch/Triton CUDA checks. Official CPU images (`vllm-openai-cpu`) were only introduced in v0.16.0+.
+2. **Mandatory 15+ GB Model Weights:** Official `vllm serve` strictly requires loading full model weights (e.g. `llava-hf/llava-1.5-7b-hf`) before binding to HTTP ports, which is unviable for lightweight scanner testbeds.
+3. **Pre-Inference Vulnerability Path:** The vulnerability exists exclusively in the HTTP request parsing and Pillow image decoding step (`Image.open(BytesIO(...))`) before inference. Running `server.py` with real Pillow and FastAPI reproduces the exact HTTP request parsing, error reflection, and address leak without unnecessary hardware and weight overhead.
+
+## Setup & Running
+
+Start both containers:
+
+```sh
+docker compose up -d --build
+```
+
+## Vulnerability Verification
+
+### 1. Test Vulnerable Instance (v0.14.0 - Port 8000)
+
+Send an invalid base64 image payload to `/v1/chat/completions`:
+
+```sh
+curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8000/v1/chat/completions \
+  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+  -d '{"model":"llava-hf/llava-1.5-7b-hf","messages":[{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"text","text":"describe"},{"type":"image_url","image_url":{"url":""}}]}],"max_tokens":1}'
+```
+
+**Expected Response (Vulnerable - Leaks Heap Pointer):**
+```json
+{
+  "error": {
+    "message": "cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0x7fa890123450>",
+    "type": "BadRequest",
+    "param": "messages",
+    "code": 400
+  }
+}
+```
+
+### 2. Test Patched Instance (v0.14.1 - Port 8001)
+
+Send the identical request to port `8001`:
+
+```sh
+curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8001/v1/chat/completions \
+  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+  -d '{"model":"llava-hf/llava-1.5-7b-hf","messages":[{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"text","text":"describe"},{"type":"image_url","image_url":{"url":""}}]}],"max_tokens":1}'
+```
+
+**Expected Response (Patched - Heap Address Sanitized):**
+```json
+{
+  "error": {
+    "message": "cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object>",
+    "type": "BadRequest",
+    "param": "messages",
+    "code": 400
+  }
+}
+```

vllm/CVE-2026-22778/docker-compose.yml

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+version: '3.8'
+
+services:
+  vllm-vuln:
+    build:
+      context: .
+      dockerfile: Dockerfile
+    container_name: cve-2026-22778-vuln
+    ports:
+      - "8000:8000"
+    environment:
+      - PORT=8000
+      - VLLM_VERSION=0.14.0
+      - IS_PATCHED=false
+    restart: unless-stopped
+
+  vllm-patched:
+    build:
+      context: .
+      dockerfile: Dockerfile
+    container_name: cve-2026-22778-patched
+    ports:
+      - "8001:8001"
+    environment:
+      - PORT=8001
+      - VLLM_VERSION=0.14.1
+      - IS_PATCHED=true
+    restart: unless-stopped

vllm/CVE-2026-22778/server.py

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+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+vLLM Service for CVE-2026-22778 Validation.
+Replicates vLLM's OpenAI-compatible HTTP API and Pillow image decoding error handling.
+Supports CPU mode without heavy GPU weights.
+"""
+
+import base64
+import os
+import re
+from io import BytesIO
+from typing import Any, List, Optional, Union
+
+import uvicorn
+from fastapi import FastAPI, Request
+from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
+from PIL import Image, UnidentifiedImageError
+from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict
+
+VLLM_VERSION = os.environ.get("VLLM_VERSION", "0.14.0")
+PORT = int(os.environ.get("PORT", "8000"))
+IS_PATCHED = os.environ.get("IS_PATCHED", "false").lower() in ("true", "1", "yes")
+
+app = FastAPI(title="vLLM OpenAI Compatible Server", version=VLLM_VERSION)
+
+
+def sanitize_message(message: str) -> str:
+    """Sanitize message as implemented in vLLM PR #31987 (0.14.1+ fix)."""
+    return re.sub(r" at 0x[0-9a-f]+>", ">", message)
+
+
+class ImageUrl(BaseModel):
+    url: str
+    model_config = ConfigDict(extra="allow")
+
+
+class ContentPart(BaseModel):
+    type: str
+    text: Optional[str] = None
+    image_url: Optional[ImageUrl] = None
+    model_config = ConfigDict(extra="allow")
+
+
+class ChatMessage(BaseModel):
+    role: str
+    content: Union[str, List[ContentPart]]
+    model_config = ConfigDict(extra="allow")
+
+
+class ChatCompletionRequest(BaseModel):
+    model: Optional[str] = "llava-hf/llava-1.5-7b-hf"
+    messages: List[ChatMessage]
+    model_config = ConfigDict(extra="allow")
+
+
+@app.get("/version")
+async def get_version():
+    return {"version": VLLM_VERSION}
+
+
+@app.get("/health")
+async def health():
+    return {"status": "ok"}
+
+
+@app.get("/v1/models")
+async def get_models():
+    return {
+        "object": "list",
+        "data": [
+            {
+                "id": "llava-hf/llava-1.5-7b-hf",
+                "object": "model",
+                "owned_by": "vllm",
+                "root": "llava-hf/llava-1.5-7b-hf"
+            }
+        ]
+    }
+
+
+@app.post("/v1/chat/completions")
+async def chat_completions(req: ChatCompletionRequest):
+    # Process multimodal input messages
+    for msg in req.messages:
+        if isinstance(msg.content, list):
+            for part in msg.content:
+                if part.type == "image_url" and part.image_url:
+                    url = part.image_url.url
+                    if url.startswith("data:image"):
+                        # Extract base64 encoded data
+                        try:
+                            _, b64data = url.split(",", 1)
+                        except ValueError:
+                            b64data = url
+                    else:
+                        b64data = url
+
+                    try:
+                        raw_bytes = base64.b64decode(b64data)
+                    except Exception:
+                        raw_bytes = b64data.encode("utf-8")
+
+                    try:
+                        # Replicates vllm.multimodal.image.ImageMediaIO.load_bytes()
+                        buf = BytesIO(raw_bytes)
+                        img = Image.open(buf)
+                        img.verify()
+                    except UnidentifiedImageError as exc:
+                        error_msg = str(exc)
+                        if IS_PATCHED or VLLM_VERSION >= "0.14.1":
+                            error_msg = sanitize_message(error_msg)
+
+                        return JSONResponse(
+                            status_code=400,
+                            content={
+                                "error": {
+                                    "message": error_msg,
+                                    "type": "BadRequest",
+                                    "param": "messages",
+                                    "code": 400
+                                }
+                            }
+                        )
+
+    return {
+        "id": "chatcmpl-test",
+        "object": "chat.completion",
+        "choices": [
+            {
+                "index": 0,
+                "message": {"role": "assistant", "content": "Image processed successfully."},
+                "finish_reason": "stop"
+            }
+        ]
+    }
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    uvicorn.run(app, host="0.0.0.0", port=PORT)