chore: Add supply-chain provenance guidance to agent skills - #6644
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antonis wants to merge 1 commit into
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chore: Add supply-chain provenance guidance to agent skills#6644antonis wants to merge 1 commit into
antonis wants to merge 1 commit into
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Add a reference doc plus a code-guidelines rule and a review Correctness bullet so newly added or changed third-party references — npm deps, VS Code extension recommendations, GitHub Actions, and native deps — are verified as real artifacts under a trusted namespace before landing. Complements the shared getsentry/skills supply-chain coverage and adds the surface those miss (chiefly editor extensions), motivated by the nickelpack.oxlint case in #6640. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Semver Impact of This PR⚪ None (no version bump detected) 📋 Changelog PreviewThis is how your changes will appear in the changelog.
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antonis
marked this pull request as ready for review
September 1, 2026 10:05
geoffg-sentry
approved these changes
Sep 1, 2026
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| When adding or changing any third-party reference — an npm dependency, a `.vscode/extensions.json` recommendation, a GitHub Action (`uses:`), or a native dependency (Podfile / Gemfile / Gradle) — verify it is published by its legitimate owner **before** referencing it. The tool being real is not enough: the *namespace* must be one the project trusts. Prefer Sentry's own scope/org (`@sentry/*`, `getsentry/*`), then the artifact's documented official publisher, and pin to an exact version / full commit SHA rather than a floating tag. Treat an unscoped or unfamiliar-publisher name as a supply-chain risk until proven otherwise — a claimable namespace lets an attacker ship code to every contributor. See [references/supply-chain.md](references/supply-chain.md) for the surface-by-surface checklist and verification commands. |
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In regard to this line, what is a legitimate owner ? The package could come from a legitimate owner but their project/account got compromised, and a malicious release was made using the legitimate owner.
Might be worth to add something like, even if the third-party dependency comes from a legitimate owner, double check for any news that the given version is not malicious
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📢 Type of change
📜 Description
Adds supply-chain / dependency-provenance guidance to the agent skills:
code-guidelines/references/supply-chain.md— new reference: the rule (a newly added/changed reference must be a real artifact and under a trusted namespace), a trust hierarchy (Sentry scope → official publisher → pinned ref), a per-surface table (npm,.vscodeextensions, GitHub Actions, iOS/Android native, Ruby), verification commands, and what existing checks (Dependabot / CodeQL / Warden) do and don't cover.code-guidelines/SKILL.md— an "Adding dependencies" rule pointing at the reference.review/SKILL.md— a "Supply-chain / dependency provenance" bullet in the Correctness axis.💡 Motivation and Context
Catch issues like #6640, where a recommended VS Code extension (
nickelpack.oxlint) pointed at a publisher namespace that isn't the tool's owner (oxc). The additive value over the sharedgetsentry/skillscoverage is provenance of newly introduced references and the surfaces those miss — chiefly editor extensions.💚 How did you test it?
Not runtime-testable (Markdown). Verified links resolve, the
.vscode/Dependabot claims match the repo, and the reference is cited from bothcode-guidelinesandreview.📝 Checklist
sendDefaultPIIis enabled.🔮 Next steps
Once #6643 merges, this PR's base auto-retargets to
main.