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[ciqlts9_2] Multiple patches tested (6 commits) - #1761
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November 4, 2026 06:43
jira VULN-193285 cve CVE-2026-63920 commit-author Qi Tang <tpluszz77@gmail.com> commit dd43367 ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl() builds IPV6_{HOPOPTS,DSTOPTS,RTHDR} cmsgs (and their IPV6_2292* legacy counterparts) by trusting the on-wire hdrlen byte (ptr[1]) when computing the put_cmsg() length. The length was validated only at parse time (ipv6_parse_hopopts(), etc.). An nftables payload-write expression can rewrite hdrlen after parsing and before the skb reaches recvmsg; the write itself is in-bounds but put_cmsg() then reads up to ((hdrlen+1) << 3) = 2040 bytes from an 8-byte header. nftables is reachable from an unprivileged user namespace, so this is an unprivileged slab-out-of-bounds read: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in put_cmsg+0x3ac/0x540 put_cmsg+0x3ac/0x540 udpv6_recvmsg+0xca0/0x1250 sock_recvmsg+0xdf/0x190 ____sys_recvmsg+0x1b1/0x620 Add ipv6_get_exthdr_len() which validates that at least two bytes are accessible before reading the hdrlen field, then checks the computed length against skb_tail_pointer(skb), returning 0 on failure. Extension headers are kept in the linear skb area by pskb_may_pull() during input, so skb_tail_pointer() is the correct bound. Use ipv6_get_exthdr_len() at all non-AH call sites: the five standalone cmsg blocks (HbH, 2292HbH, 2292DSTOPTS x2, 2292RTHDR) and the three standard cases in the extension-header walk loop (DSTOPTS, ROUTING, default). AH retains an inline bounds check because its length formula differs ((ptr[1]+2)<<2). The walk loop also gets a pre-read bounds check at the top to validate ptr before any case accesses ptr[0] or ptr[1]. When the walk loop detects a corrupted header, return from the function instead of continuing to process later socket options. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Qi Tang <tpluszz77@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260523143245.2281415-1-tpluszz77@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit dd43367) Signed-off-by: CIQ Kernel Automation <ciq_kernel_automation@ciq.com>
jira VULN-195748 cve CVE-2026-63831 commit-author Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai> commit 84a04eb llsec_do_encrypt_unauth(), llsec_do_encrypt_auth(), llsec_do_decrypt_unauth(), and llsec_do_decrypt_auth() all perform in-place cryptographic transformations on skb data. They build a scatterlist with sg_init_one() pointing into the skb's linear data area and then pass the same scatterlist as both src and dst to the crypto API (e.g. crypto_skcipher_encrypt/decrypt, crypto_aead_encrypt/decrypt). On the RX path, __ieee802154_rx_handle_packet() clones the received skb before handing it to each subscriber via ieee802154_subif_frame(). The cloned skb shares the same underlying data buffer via reference counting. When llsec_do_decrypt() subsequently modifies this shared buffer in place, it corrupts data that other clones -- potentially belonging to other sockets or subsystems -- still reference. On the TX path, similar data sharing can occur when an skb's head has been cloned (skb_cloned() returns true). The fix is to call skb_cow_data() before performing any in-place crypto operation. skb_cow_data() ensures that the skb's data area is not shared: if the skb head is cloned or the data spans multiple fragments, it copies the data into a private buffer that can be safely modified in place. This is the same pattern used by: - ESP (net/ipv4/esp4.c, net/ipv6/esp6.c) - MACsec (drivers/net/macsec.c) - WireGuard (drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c) - TIPC (net/tipc/crypto.c) Without this guard, in-place crypto on shared skb data leads to: - Silent data corruption of other skb clones - Use-after-free when the crypto API scatterwalk writes through a page that has already been freed by another clone's kfree_skb() - Kernel crashes under concurrent 802.15.4 traffic with security enabled (KASAN/KMSAN reports slab-use-after-free) Found by 0sec (https://0sec.ai) using automated source analysis. Fixes: 4c14a2f ("mac802154: add llsec decryption method") Fixes: 03556e4 ("mac802154: add llsec encryption method") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-wpan/20260525161806.96158-1-doruk@0sec.ai/ Reviewed-by: Alexander Lobakin <aleksander.lobakin@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai> Closes: <link to your mail on lore> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260526183726.56100-1-doruk@0sec.ai Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@datenfreihafen.org> (cherry picked from commit 84a04eb) Signed-off-by: CIQ Kernel Automation <ciq_kernel_automation@ciq.com>
jira VULN-201499 cve CVE-2026-72243 commit-author Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> commit 44c74d2 Similar to Landlock, SELinux was not updated when TCP Fast Open support was introduced to ensure connect-related permissions are checked when using TCP Fast Open. Update its socket_sendmsg() hook to call selinux_socket_connect() when MSG_FASTOPEN is passed. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20260616201615.275032-1-hexlabsecurity@proton.me/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20260617180526.15627-2-matthieu@buffet.re/ Reported-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me> Reported-by: Matthieu Buffet <matthieu@buffet.re> Reported-by: Mikhail Ivanov <ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Tested-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> (cherry picked from commit 44c74d2) Signed-off-by: CIQ Kernel Automation <ciq_kernel_automation@ciq.com>
jira VULN-204839 cve CVE-2026-74641 commit-author Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com> commit 2ca1eea snd_us428ctls_vm_fault() turns the faulting page offset into a kernel address with no bound of any kind: offset = vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT; vaddr = (char *)(...)->us428ctls_sharedmem + offset; page = virt_to_page(vaddr); get_page(page); vmf->page = page; return 0; snd_us428ctls_mmap() checks only the length of the mapping, never the offset, and us428ctls_sharedmem is a single page from alloc_pages_exact(). For a character device file_mmap_size_max() returns ULONG_MAX, so the mm layer imposes no ceiling either. Every page offset above zero resolves to a struct page outside the object, and the handler installs it into the caller's address space read-write; the vma is not marked read-only. The caller picks the page frame with a single mmap() argument and gets read-write access to a page of kernel memory it does not own; an offset that lands in an unpopulated vmemmap region oopses instead. A process that can open the hwdep node of an attached US-X2Y reaches this after loading the FPGA image through the same node; no capability check is involved. On 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64), mmap() with a large offset: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fffffdffc45d5ac8 pc : snd_us428ctls_vm_fault+0x68/0x140 [snd_usb_usx2y] Call trace: snd_us428ctls_vm_fault+0x68/0x140 [snd_usb_usx2y] __do_fault __handle_mm_fault handle_mm_fault el0_da Reject any offset outside the shared region. The pcm hwdep handler in usx2yhwdeppcm.c computes its address the same way and needs the same bound. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com> Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: Federico Kirschbaum <federico.kirschbaum@xbow.com> Reported-by: Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260805013445.38283-1-baul.lee@xbow.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> (cherry picked from commit 2ca1eea) Signed-off-by: CIQ Kernel Automation <ciq_kernel_automation@ciq.com>
jira VULN-212443 cve CVE-2026-89846 commit-author Nilesh Javali <njavali@marvell.com> commit ca6d880 In qla2x00_status_entry(), the FWI2 status path advances sense_data and shrinks par_sense_len by rsp_info_len: if (IS_FWI2_CAPABLE(ha)) { sense_data += rsp_info_len; par_sense_len -= rsp_info_len; } rsp_info_len is a 32-bit value taken directly from the target's FCP response (sf.rsp_data_len), while par_sense_len is the IOCB data area size (28 bytes for 24xx, 60 bytes for 29xx). A hostile or buggy target reporting an rsp_info_len larger than par_sense_len makes the unsigned subtraction underflow to a huge value and advances sense_data out of bounds. The underflowed par_sense_len then defeats the cap in qla2x00_handle_sense(): if (sense_len > par_sense_len) sense_len = par_sense_len; memcpy(cp->sense_buffer, sense_data, sense_len); so the memcpy reads up to SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE bytes from the out-of-bounds sense_data pointer, leaking adjacent response-ring/heap memory into the command's sense buffer. Clamp rsp_info_len to par_sense_len before the subtraction so par_sense_len can never underflow and sense_data stays within the IOCB data area. The fix sits before the comp_status switch, covering both qla2x00_handle_sense() call sites. Fixes: 5544213 ("[SCSI] qla2xxx: Correct extended sense-data handling.") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Sashiko <sashiko-dev@google.com> Signed-off-by: Nilesh Javali <njavali@marvell.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260730155838.2119230-16-njavali@marvell.com Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen (Oracle) <mkp@kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit ca6d880) Signed-off-by: CIQ Kernel Automation <ciq_kernel_automation@ciq.com>
jira VULN-216871 cve CVE-2026-80792 commit-author Luxiao Xu <rakukuip@gmail.com> commit d0d48d9 ip6_finish_output2() caches a pointer to the IPv6 destination address (daddr) before invoking lwtunnel_xmit(). The LWT-BPF transmit path or other encapsulation operations within lwtunnel_xmit() can reallocate the skb head, freeing the memory that daddr points to. When lwtunnel_xmit() returns LWTUNNEL_XMIT_CONTINUE, the function continues to use the stale daddr pointer to compute the nexthop and to look up or create the neighbour entry. This results in a use-after-free read, which can leak sensitive kernel data, pollute the neighbour table with arbitrary values, misdirect traffic, or crash the system. Fix this by re-fetching the IPv6 header and the destination address pointer after lwtunnel_xmit() returns LWTUNNEL_XMIT_CONTINUE, ensuring that the subsequent nexthop computation and neighbour lookup operate on valid memory. Fixes: e415ed3 ("ipv6: use skb_expand_head in ip6_finish_output2") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Vega <vega@nebusec.ai> Signed-off-by: Luxiao Xu <rakukuip@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <weir@nebusec.ai> Reviewed-by: Vadim Fedorenko <vadim.fedorenko@linux.dev> Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/4aa3f53bc44e79572c6dd2340ec7b68ef1a3d87d.1786516730.git.rakukuip@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit d0d48d9) Signed-off-by: CIQ Kernel Automation <ciq_kernel_automation@ciq.com>
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