Raven sits between the kernel and Windows programs: it is the handler the kernel runs for every .exe, it mounts filesystems inside user namespaces, it parses binary registry hives and unpacks archives it did not write, and it can hand a program raw access to a disk. A bug in any of those is a security bug, and reports are welcome.

Only the latest release receives security fixes. There is no backport branch: the fix for a vulnerability is the next release, which Colony and the release page deliver.

Please report vulnerabilities privately via GitHub Security Advisories ("Report a vulnerability"). Do not open a public issue for exploitable bugs.

Include what you have:

• what an attacker controls, and what they get;
• the version (raven --version), distribution and kernel version;
• the steps, or the file (archive, hive, .exe, environment name) that reproduces it.

The report stays private until a fixed release is out, and you are credited in the release notes if you want to be.

Reports of particular interest:

• The binfmt handler. Once registered, the kernel runs Raven for every .exe that anyone on the machine executes. Anything that lets a crafted .exe or path make Raven do more than launch it in the environment it belongs to.
• The mount code. Raven mounts overlayfs inside an unprivileged user and mount namespace. An escape from that namespace, a write that reaches the read-only Windows base, or an environment name or path that resolves outside ~/.local/share/Colony/Raven/ or $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/raven/.
• The registry hive parser. Hives come from a Windows image the user supplies and are parsed as untrusted input. A crash, a hang, or a key that escapes the allow-listed subtrees into the projected registry.
• DXVK and vkd3d archive unpacking. Archives are untrusted. Path traversal, symlink or hard-link escapes, files that land outside the private unpack directory, or a race that swaps libraries between unpacking and the copy into the environment.
• Device attach. raven env attach links a block device into an environment. Anything that attaches a device the user did not name, or that changes a device node's permissions.
• Release signing. Every release asset is signed with the organisation's ed25519 key, as described in the README's code signing policy. An asset that verifies but was not built from this repository, or a .meta that does not match its asset, is critical.

Out of scope: what Windows programs do once launched (Raven does not sandbox them, and says so in the README's privacy section), bugs in Wine, DXVK or vkd3d-proton themselves (report those upstream), and raw disk access that the user granted through raven env attach and the device node's permissions.