diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 1f0383e..134e16f 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ restart, Wasm, Node adapters, local workerd KV, Compose with a named volume and
 container restart) and live on Cloudflare Workers with KV, on the Cloud Run
 container with Almide reading and writing Cloud Storage itself, and on Cloud Run
 functions with Cloud Storage; each store held exactly the two saved notes
-afterwards. The ConoHa VPS run predates `/notes`.
+afterwards. On the ConoHa VPS (x86_64, created with Terraform) the scenario passed,
+the volume file held the two notes, and they survived a container restart.
 
 GitHub Actions (`ubuntu-24.04`, compiler install and every reproduction step) has
 passed. See [verification notes](docs/verification.md) for exact commands and limits.
diff --git a/docs/verification.md b/docs/verification.md
index e2a3bee..11aa2ca 100644
--- a/docs/verification.md
+++ b/docs/verification.md
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ Live:
      and wrote with `fetch`. 18/18 and the scenario 11/11 (octet-stream bodies)
    - Each bucket's `notes` object held exactly the two saved notes
      (`application/json`, 53 bytes); unauthenticated requests got 403
-3. The ConoHa VPS was not rerun with `/notes` (its run predates it)
+3. The ConoHa VPS: see [ConoHa VPS with /notes](#conoha-vps-with-notes)
 
 Not shown: behavior under concurrent writers. The single-key read-modify-write
 has no conditional write, so concurrent instances can lose a note.
@@ -333,10 +333,28 @@ The application was main at `c904bf7`.
      `gcf-v2-sources-*` bucket and `gcf-artifacts` repository were not managed
      by Terraform and remained until the project was deleted
 
+## ConoHa VPS with /notes
+
+Date: 2026-10-04, main at `e73081a`, the same Terraform (`g2l-t-c4m4`, SSH from
+the operator's /32 only); the provider installed with `go install` and
+`~/.terraformrc` dev_overrides.
+
+1. `terraform apply`: 5 resources in about 30 s; Ubuntu x86_64, Docker 29.2.1
+2. cloud-init's first-boot upgrades took 714 s; `docker compose build` 98 s
+3. Through `ssh -L` to the VPS loopback: the 18 cases and the `/notes` scenario
+   passed (29/29). The container ran with `STORE_DIR=/data`, a read-only root
+   filesystem, UID 65532 and `CapDrop=[ALL]`; the app listened on
+   `127.0.0.1:8080` only and port 8080 on the public address was unreachable
+4. `notes.json` in the `conoha_notes` volume (owned by 65532) held exactly the
+   two saved notes; after `docker compose down` (0.6 s) and `up` the list was
+   unchanged
+5. `terraform destroy` removed all 5; only the account's existing server and
+   its volume remained
+
 ## Not established
 
 - Native x86_64 Docker build outside the ConoHa VPS
-- `/notes` on the ConoHa VPS, and `/notes` under concurrent writers on any route
+- `/notes` under concurrent writers on any route
 - ConoHa TLS/reverse proxy, restart behavior, production load, or plans smaller
   than `g2l-t-c4m4`
 - Azure Container Apps or ECS Fargate provider validation/deployment
diff --git a/providers/conoha/README.md b/providers/conoha/README.md
index 4154e6c..e66557b 100644
--- a/providers/conoha/README.md
+++ b/providers/conoha/README.md
@@ -72,7 +72,9 @@ a named volume (`notes`) that outlives the container; the image creates `/data`
 owned by the runtime user, so the read-only root filesystem stays read-only.
 `docker compose down` keeps the volume; `docker compose down -v` deletes the notes.
 Locally (macOS arm64) the notes scenario passed and the notes survived
-`down` / `up`; the ConoHa VPS run above predates `/notes`.
+`down` / `up`. On the ConoHa VPS (2026-10-04, main at `e73081a`) the same held: the
+scenario passed, `notes.json` in the volume (owned by 65532) held the two notes,
+and they survived `down` / `up`.
 
 Compose binds the app only to the host loopback address. For public access, place
 a TLS reverse proxy in front and configure the intended ConoHa security group